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1. Introduction 
 
There are at least three competing assumptions concerning household preferences in 
economics: that individuals are selfish, that they are altruistic, and that they have a 
desire for dynasty building.  The three assumptions have very different implications 
for bequest motives and bequest division, so examining survey data on stated bequest 
motives and bequest division plans is a promising way of shedding light on which 
assumption holds in the real world, and comparing bequest plans in different countries 
is a promising way of shedding light on whether different assumptions apply in 
different countries. 
 
In this paper, we discuss the three alternative assumptions concerning household 
preferences and show that these assumptions have very different implications for 
bequest motives and bequest division.  After reviewing some of the literature on actual 
bequests, bequest motives, and bequest division, we present data on the strength of 
bequest motives, stated bequest motives, and bequest division plans from a new 
international survey on bequest plans conducted in the People’s Republic of China 
(hereafter China), India, Japan, and the United States.  We then speculate about 
possible reasons for inter-country differences in bequest plans and consider the policy 
implications of our findings.  
 
As shown in subsection 2.1, positive bequests are consistent with all three assumptions 
concerning household preferences, and thus it is not possible to draw inferences about 
which assumption holds in the real world unless we have information on households’ 
motives for leaving bequests.  Most previous studies try to infer households’ 
preferences from their actual behavior because they do not have any direct information 
on households’ bequest motives, but there are many econometric and other difficulties 
in making such inferences.  The current paper makes a significant original 
contribution to this literature not only by presenting direct information on households’ 
stated bequest motives and bequest division plans but also by presenting such 
information on four countries (China, India, Japan, and the United States) with very 
different levels of economic development, cultures, etc., allowing us to see whether or 
not household preferences vary from country to country. 
 
To summarize the main findings of this paper, it shows using data from a new 
international survey on bequest plans that there are striking inter-country differences 
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in bequest plans, with the bequest plans of Americans and Indians appearing to be 
much more consistent with selfish preferences than those of the Japanese and Chinese 
and the bequest plans of the Japanese and Chinese appearing to be much more 
consistent with selfish preferences than those of Americans and Indians.  These 
inter-country differences in bequest plans may partly reflect inter-country differences in 
social safety nets and social norms and partly reflect inter-country differences in 
household preferences. 
 
These findings have important implications for the efficacy and desirability of 
stimulative fiscal policies, public pensions, and inheritance taxes, with stimulative 
fiscal policies being more effective, public pensions being more effective in raising the 
living standards of the aged, and inheritance taxes being less necessary in countries 
such as Japan and China in which households are selfishly motivated and conversely in 
countries such as the United States and India in which households are altruistically 
motivated. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss alternative 
assumptions concerning household preferences, show that these assumptions have very 
different implications for bequest motives and bequest division, and review some of the 
literature on actual bequests, bequest motives, and bequest division.  In section 3, we 
describe the international survey on bequest plans used in this paper, and in section 4, 
we present evidence from this survey on bequest plans in China, India, Japan, and the 
United States.  In section 5, we explore possible reasons for inter-country differences in 
bequest plans, and finally, section 6 summarizes, concludes, and explores the policy 
implications of our findings. 
 
 
2. Bequests: Assumptions, Models, and Empirical Evidence  
 
2.1. Theoretical Considerations 
 
In this subsection, we discuss three assumptions concerning household preferences that 
are made in the theoretical literature and explore the implications of these assumptions 
for bequest motives and bequest division (see Cremer, Kessler, and Pestieau (1992), 
Masson and Pestieau (1996), and Laferrere and Wolff (2006) for more extensive 
expositions and Horioka, et al. (2014) for an illustrative model).   
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Three examples of assumptions concerning household preferences that underlie 
theoretical models of parental consumption and saving are as follows:１ 
 
(1) The household is selfish and derives utility only from its own consumption (as 
assumed in the selfish life cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954)) 
(2) The household is altruistic and derives utility not only from its own consumption 
but also from the consumption of others, especially that of its children, parents, and 
other family members (as assumed in the altruism model of Barro (1974), Becker 
(1974, 1981, 1991), and Stark (1995)) 
(3) The household cares not about itself or its children but about the perpetuation of the 
family line and/or the family business and tries to minimize the probability of 
extinction of the family line and/or the family business (as assumed in the dynasty 
or primogeniture model of Chu (1991))２ 
 
We now explore the implications of each of these assumptions concerning household 
preferences for bequest motives and bequest division.  We will use the term “bequest” 
throughout this paper for brevity, but the reader should bear in mind that our analysis 
applies to all intergenerational transfers including inter vivos transfers and in-kind 
transfers such as care, attention, and co-residence (see Molina (2013) and the papers 
cited therein for more on in-kind transfers).  Note, however, that the determinants of 
inter vivos transfers and bequests may differ (see, for example, Dunn and Phillips 
(1997), McGarry (1999), and Slavik and Wiseman; see Arrondel and Masson (2006) for a 
useful survey).  Most of these studies find, for example, that inter vivos transfers tend 
to be divided unequally whereas bequests tend to be divided equally. 
 
Looking first at selfish preferences, the implication of such preferences for bequest 
motives is that households will leave no bequests to their children, leave only 
unintended bequests arising from lifespan uncertainty (see, for example, Davies (1981)), 
or leave bequests only if their children provide care, attention and/or financial support 
during old age.  One variant of the third case (the so-called “selfish exchange model”) is 
Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers’s (1985) “strategic bequest motive,” wherein parents 
use the threat of disinheritance to induce their children to provide care and/or attention 
during old age, and another variant of this case is Kotlikoff and Spivak’s (1981) “implicit 
intra-family annuity contract,” wherein parents receive an annuity from their children 
until death in exchange for giving their children an ex post premium in the form of a 
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bequest.３  The implication of selfish preferences for bequest division is that households 
will leave more or all of their bequest to the child who provides more care, attention 
and/or financial support during old age.  Thus, equal division is inconsistent with the 
selfish life cycle model unless all children provide exactly the same amount of care, 
attention and/or financial support, which is unlikely (Menchik (1988) and Bernheim 
and Severinov (2003)). 
 
Looking next at altruistic preferences, the implication of such preferences for bequest 
motives is that households will leave a bequest to their children even if they do not 
provide care, attention, and/or financial support during old age and do not carry on the 
family line and/or the family business, and the implication of this model for bequest 
division is that households will leave more or all of their bequest to the child who has 
greater needs and/or less earnings capacity (that is, bequests will be compensatory) 
(Becker (1981, 1991)).  Thus, equal division is not consistent with the simplest version 
of the altruism model unless all children have the same needs and the same earnings 
capacities (which is very, very unlikely), but if it is assumed that children derive 
disutility from receiving a smaller share of their parents’ inheritance than their siblings 
(what Stark (1998) calls “relative deprivation”), altruistic parents may choose to divide 
their bequests equally even if their children’s needs or earnings capacities differ (see 
also Bernheim and Severinov (2003)).  By contrast, Wilhelm (1996) argues that it is the 
parents rather than the children who derive disutility from unequal division, perhaps 
because unequal division necessitates financial costs such as the cost of drawing up a 
will and/or psychic costs arising from the parents’ aversion to the inequality of bequests.  
In a similar vein, Laitner (1997) and Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000) attribute equal 
division to parents’ desire to insure post-mortem reputation, to preserve family 
solidarity, and to avoid conflicts among their children. 
 
Turning finally to dynastic preferences, the implication of such preferences for bequest 
motives is that households will leave a bequest to their children only if they carry on the 
family line and/or the family business, and the implication of this model for bequest 
division is that households will leave more or all of their bequest to the child who carries 
on the family line and/or the family business. 
 
Thus, the various assumptions concerning household preferences have very different 
implications for bequest motives and bequest division, and thus we can shed light on 
which assumption concerning household preferences holds in the real world by looking 
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at empirical evidence on bequest motives and bequest division. 
 
It should be noted, however, that bequest motives and bequest division depend not only 
on household preferences but also on outside influences on household bequest behavior 
such as income levels, income growth, inheritance laws, tax policies, social safety nets, 
social norms, and other institutions and government policies.  For example, altruistic 
households may not necessarily leave a bequest to their children even if they want to if 
they are too poor to do so, if income growth is high (meaning that the lifetime incomes of 
children exceed the lifetime incomes of parents), inheritance taxes are too high, and/or if 
the social norm is for parents to invest heavily in their children’s human capital, which 
renders them incapable of leaving large bequests to their children.  Alternatively, 
selfish households may not need to use bequests as a way of inducing or coercing their 
children to provide care and/or attention during old age if social safety nets for the 
elderly (public old-age pensions, long-term care insurance, health insurance, etc.) are 
adequate.  Furthermore, households may be more likely to divide their bequests 
unequally if the social norm is for parents to leave everything to the eldest son in 
exchange for the eldest son living with, and taking care of, the parents in old age.  
Finally, selfish households may not be able to leave more to the child who took better 
care of them even if they want to if inheritance laws require them to divide their 
bequest equally among their children. 
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence on Bequests 
 
There have been many empirical studies that try to determine which assumption 
concerning household preferences holds in the real world by looking at actual bequests, 
bequest motives, and bequest division.  In this subsection, we review some of this 
literature to see how much light it can shed on the issue of which assumption 
concerning household preferences holds in the real world.  This review is selective due 
to space limitations and the large size of the existing literature.  It focuses on studies 
that shed light on the issue of which assumption concerning household preferences 
holds in the real world and on studies that use data for the United States and Japan. 
For more comprehensive surveys, see Arrondel and Masson (2006) and Laferrere and 
Wolf (2006).  
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2.2.1. Empirical Evidence on Actual Bequests 
 
We look first at empirical studies that have attempted to measure the importance of 
actual bequests.  In a seminal study, Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) calculate the share 
of bequests and other intergenerational transfers in total household wealth in the 
United States and obtain the surprising finding that this share is 46-81% depending on 
the calculation method used.  Modigliani (1988) criticizes Kotlikoff and Summers’ 
(1981) calculations on a number of grounds and claims that the true value of this share 
is 17-20%, but Kotlikoff (1988) argues that some of Modigliani’s adjustments are 
excessive or unwarranted.  Barthold and Ito (1992) calculate this share for both Japan 
and the United States and find that it is 25-40% in both countries, that it is higher in 
Japan under certain assumptions, and that it is higher in the United States under other 
assumptions.  Turning to studies for Japan, Hayashi (1986) finds that this share is at 
least 9.6%, Dekle (1989) finds that it is 3-48.7%, Campbell (1997) finds that it is at most 
23.4-28.1%, Horioka, et al. (2002) finds that it is 23.9%, and Horioka (2009) finds that it 
is 15.2-17.9% (see Horioka (1993) for a review of this literature).  The range of these 
estimates is quite broad, but the consensus seems to be that bequests and other 
intergenerational transfers are quantitatively more important in the United States 
than in Japan. 
 
2.2.2. Empirical Evidence on Bequest Motives 
 
Turning next to the issue of what motivates bequests, since few household surveys ask 
respondents directly about their attitudes towards bequests, most previous studies have 
tried to infer respondents’ bequest motives from the impact of bequests on the amount of 
care, attention, and/or financial assistance that aged parents receive from their children.  
If bequests are altruistically motivated (and altruism is one-sided), there should not be 
any correlation between bequests from parents to children and care, attention, and/or 
financial assistance from children to aged parents, whereas if bequests are motivated by 
selfish exchange, there should be a positive correlation between bequests from parents 
to children and care, attention, and/or financial assistance from children to aged 
parents.   
 
Looking first at studies that use U.S. data, one study of this genre is Menchik, et al. 
(1988), which obtains a positive correlation between the parents’ intention to bequeath 
and the frequency of their children’s telephone calls and visits, a result which appears 
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to support the selfish exchange model.  However, this study fails to distinguish 
between single-child families and multiple-child families, as done by later studies.  
 
The reference study on the impact of bequests on the amount of attention from one’s 
children is Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985), which finds, using data from the 
Longitudinal Retirement History Survey (LRHS), that bequeathable wealth has a 
positive and significant impact on the frequency of phone calls and visits from one’s 
children in the case of families with two or more children, even after controlling for the 
parents’ age, health, and employment status, but that it has a negative and 
insignificant impact on the frequency of phone calls and visits in the case of families 
with only one child and that non-bequeathable wealth does not have a significant 
impact on the frequency of phone calls and visits in either sample.  All of these results 
appear to support the selfish exchange model because only bequeathable wealth should 
influence the behavior of children and because parents’ threat of disinheritance is not 
credible if they have only one child.   
 
However, Perozek (1998) replicates Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers’ (1985) test using 
a richer data set (the 1987 National Survey of Families and Households (NSFH)) and 
finds that bequeathable wealth no longer has a significant impact on attention from 
one’s children when additional child and family characteristics are taken into account 
and/or a more comprehensive measure of attention is used. 
 
Moreover, Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (2000) analyze inter vivos time and money 
transfers from parents to children as well as those from children to parents, using data 
from the 1988 wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and find little 
evidence that parental income or wealth raises time transfers from children or that time 
transfers from children to parents are exchanged for money transfers from parents to 
children or conversely.  Similarly, Ioannides and Kan (2000) analyze two-directional 
inter vivos transfers of time and money between parents and children and find that 
they are motivated by mutual altruism rather than by selfish exchange motives. 
 
Furthermore, Horioka, et al. (2000) analyze data from the “Comparative Survey of 
Savings in Japan and the United States,” conducted in 1996 by the former Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications of the Japanese Government, and find that parent-child 
co-residence rates are much higher for parents with a weak bequest motive (12.02%) 
than they are for parents with a strong bequest motive (6.7 to 7.5%) and that they are, if 
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anything, lower for parents with a strong bequest motive (6.7 to 7.5%) than they are for 
parents with no bequest motive at all (7.7%) in the case of the United States.  All of 
these results are inconsistent with the selfish exchange model. 
 
Thus, the most careful studies of the impact of bequests on the amount of care, attention, 
and/or financial assistance from children that use U.S. data find little evidence in 
support of the selfish exchange model, which suggests that bequests are largely 
altruistically motivated in the United States.  To cite a few examples on the other side 
of the ledger, Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992) find that the recipient’s income has a 
positive impact on the amount of intra-family inter vivos transfers conditional on 
transfers being made and interpret this as evidence that inter vivos transfers are 
motivated by selfish exchange motives.  In a similar vein, Altonji, Hayashi, and 
Kotlikoff (1997) find that inter vivos transfers are weakly compensatory but far from 
fully compensatory.  According to Laferrere and Wolff ’s (2006) more comprehensive 
review of the literature, about two-thirds of the studies using U.S. data find support for 
the altruism model or reject the selfish exchange model, but the majority of studies 
using French data support the selfish exchange model or reject the altruism model. 
 
Turning to studies that use Japanese data, Noguchi, Uemura, and Kitou (1989) analyze 
data from their own survey and find that children are more likely to receive a bequest 
from their parents if they live with their parents, especially if they are the eldest son, 
and that their probability of receiving a bequest is higher, the higher is the amount of 
financial support they give to their parents. 
 
Turning to studies that examine the opposite direction of causality (the impact of 
parents’ bequeathable wealth or bequest motives on children’s behavior), Ohtake and 
Horioka (1994) analyze the determinants of financial support from children to parents 
and parent-child co-residence using data from the 1986 Comprehensive Survey of 
Living Conditions, conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of the 
Japanese Government.  They find that parents’ financial net worth (a component of 
bequeathable wealth) has a positive and significant impact on the amount of financial 
support from children to parents (given that the child provides financial support to his 
or her parents) and that housing wealth (also a component of bequeathable wealth) has 
a positive and significant impact on the probability of parent-child co-residence but that 
non-bequeathable wealth does not have a significant impact on either (see also Ohtake 
(1991)).   
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Similarly, Komamura (1994) analyzes data from the Survey of Retirement Assets, 
conducted in 1990 by the former Management and Coordination Agency of the Japanese 
Government, and finds that housing wealth has a positive and significant impact on the 
probability of parent-child co-residence.  
 
Moreover, the aforementioned study by Horioka, et al. (2000) finds that parent-child 
co-residence rates are highest for parents with a strong bequest motive (63-64%), much 
lower for parents with a weak bequest motive (49%), and even lower for parents with no 
bequest motive at all (25%) in the case of Japan. 
 
Furthermore, Yamada (2006) analyzes the determinants of parent-child co-residence, 
parent-child distance, and the frequency of parent-child contact using data from the 
Survey on Life Planning in the Age of Long Life, conducted in 1992 by the Japan 
Institute of Life Insurance, and finds that inheritance expectations have a significant 
impact on all three dependent variables, at least in the case of the husband’s parents, 
and that inheritance experience has a significant impact on the second and third 
dependent variables in the case of all parents as well as in the case of the husband’s 
parents. 
 
Thus, studies relating the probability of leaving bequests with the amount of care, 
attention, and/or financial assistance from children that use Japanese data find support 
for the selfish exchange model, which suggests that bequests are selfishly motivated in 
Japan, unlike in the case of the United States. 
 
Turning finally to attitudinal data on bequest motives, Horioka, et al. (2000) and 
Horioka (2002) analyze data from the aforementioned “Comparative Survey of Savings 
in Japan and the United States” and find that 42.53% of Americans plan to leave a 
bequest to their children no matter what, that 3.40% of Americans plan to leave a 
bequest to their children only if their children take care of them, that 51.13% of 
Americans do not plan to make any special efforts to leave a bequest to their children, 
and that 2.93% of Americans do not feel that it is necessary to leave a bequest to their 
children under any circumstances.  Since the first way of thinking is consistent with 
the altruism model and the second through fourth ways of thinking are consistent with 
the selfish life cycle model, these results imply that 42.53% of Americans are altruistic 
and that 57.47% are selfish. 
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By contrast, Horioka, et al. (2000) and Horioka (2002) find, using data from the same 
survey, that 19.28% of the Japanese plan to leave a bequest to their children no matter 
what, that 6.39% of the Japanese plan to leave a bequest to their children only if their 
children take care of them, that 69.33% of the Japanese do not plan to make any special 
efforts to leave a bequest to their children, and that 5.00% of the Japanese do not feel 
that it is necessary to leave a bequest to their children under any circumstances, which 
implies that 19.28% of the Japanese are altruistic and that 80.72% are selfish (see 
Horioka (2002, 2008, and 2009) for similar data from other surveys). 
 
Thus, the conclusion based on attitudinal data on bequest motives is consistent with the 
conclusion based on studies of the impact of bequests on the amount of care, attention, 
and/or financial assistance from children, with both suggesting that Americans are 
much more altruistic than the Japanese.  
 
2.2.3. Empirical Evidence on Bequest Division 
 
Turning next to the issue of bequest division, the available evidence suggests that the 
equal division of bequests among one’s children is by far the dominant practice in the 
United States.  For example, Menchik (1980) finds that bequests are divided roughly 
equally among one’s children and, in particular, that males or first-born or earlier-born 
children do not receive larger bequests than other siblings.  Similarly, Wilhelm (1996) 
finds that 68.6% of multi-child decedents divided their estates exactly equally among 
their children, that 76.6% of multi-child decedents divided their estates so that each 
child received within plus or minus 2% of the average inheritance among children in the 
family, and that 88% of multi-child decedents divided their estates approximately 
equally among their children.  Dunn and Phillips (1997) find that 90% of American 
households bequeath at least some assets to all of their children even though inter vivos 
transfers such as cash gifts and co-residence are made preferentially to poorer children.  
McGarry (1999) finds that 83% of respondents in the Asset and Health Dynamics 
(AHEAD) Study report that their wills treat all of their children approximately equally, 
while Light and McGarry (2004) find that 92.1% of respondents in the 1999 National 
Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) of Mature Women and Young Women who have children 
and who have a will say that their estate will be divided equally among their children.  
Finally, Horioka, et al. (2000) and Horioka (2002) analyze data from the aforementioned 
“Comparative Survey of Savings in Japan and the United States” and find that 84.10% 
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of Americans with two or more children plan to divide their estates equally among their 
children.   
 
By contrast, Horioka, et al. (2000) and Horioka (2002) find, using data from the same 
survey, that only 44.17% of Japanese with two or more children plan to divide their 
estates equally among their children (see Horioka (2002, 2008, and 2009) for similar 
data from other surveys). 
 
Thus, the tendency to divide estates equally among one’s children is much stronger 
(nearly twice as strong) in the United States than it is in Japan, and moreover, at least 
one study (Tomes, 1981) finds that bequest division is compensatory in the U.S., with 
low-income children inheriting more (ceteris paribus) than their advantaged siblings, 
and Dunn and Phillips (1997), McGarry (1999), and Slavik and Wiseman (2013) find 
that inter vivos transfers are unequal and compensatory in the U.S.  This suggests 
that Americans are much more altruistic than the Japanese, and this conclusion based 
on evidence on bequest division is fully consistent with our earlier conclusion based on 
evidence on bequest motives, which is reassuring. 
 
 
3. New Survey on Bequest Plans 
 
In this section, we describe the survey we use in this paper: the “Preference Parameters 
Study of Osaka University,” a new international survey that collects detailed 
information on bequest plans.  This survey was conducted annually during the 2003-13 
period in Japan, annually during the 2005-13 period in the United States, in 2006 and 
annually during the 2009-13 period in urban China, in 2007, 2010, and 2013 in rural 
China, annually during the 2009-13 period in urban India, and annually during the 
2012-13 period in rural India by the Global Center of Excellence (GCOE) Program on 
“Human Behavior and Socioeconomic Dynamics” (2003-08) of the Graduate School of 
Economics, the Institute of Social and Economic Research (Research Center for 
Behavioral Economics) of Osaka University, etc., and its predecessor, the Twenty-first 
Century Center of Excellence (COE) Program on “Behavior Macrodynamics Based on 
Surveys and Experiments” (2008-13) of the same institutions. 
 
In this paper, we use data from the 2012 waves of the Chinese, Indian, Japanese, and 
United States surveys except that we use data from the 2010 survey for rural China 
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because this survey was not conducted in 2011 or 2012.   
 
The survey for urban China is a panel survey and surveyed a random sample of males 
and females who were aged 20 to 69 in 2009 and living in one of six major cities (Beijing, 
Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Wuhan) using the interview method. 
 
The survey for rural China is a repeated cross-section survey and surveyed a random 
sample of males and females who were aged 20 to 69 and living in the rural areas of one 
of four provinces (Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan, and Liaoning) using the interview method. 
 
The survey for urban India is a panel survey and surveyed a random sample of males 
and females who were aged 20 to 69 in 2009 and living in one of six major cities (Delhi, 
Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, Kolkata, and Hyderabad) using the interview method. 
 
The survey for rural India is a panel survey and surveyed a random sample of males 
and females who were aged 20 to 69 in 2012 and living in the rural areas of one of four 
cities (Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, and Kolkata) using the interview method. 
 
The Japanese survey is a panel survey and surveyed a nationwide random sample of 
males and females who were aged 20 to 69 in 2003 using the drop-off, pick-up method.  
Fresh respondents were selected and added to the sample in the 2004, 2006 and 2009 
waves. 
 
The United States survey is a panel survey and surveyed a nationwide representative 
sample of males and females who were aged 18 to 99 in 2005 from the TNS Panel using 
a mailed questionnaire.  Fresh respondents were selected and added to the sample in 
the 2007, 2008, and 2009 waves. 
 
The data from the urban and rural surveys for China were combined by weighting the 
observations for urban and rural areas by the proportion of the population living in 
urban and rural areas in 2012 (52% and 48%, respectively) and likewise in India (32% 
and 68%, respectively) (data on urban and rural populations were taken from the World 
Bank ( 2013)). 
 
Finally, respondents whose reported age was not within the range noted above were 
dropped from the sample.  This problem arose only in the case of the United States 
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survey. 
 
Almost identical survey instruments were used in each country, making it possible to 
make direct comparisons among the four countries.  For more detailed information on 
the survey, see http://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/coe/journal/eng_panelsummary.html. 
 
 
4. Evidence from the New Survey on Bequest Plans 
 
In this section, we discuss our findings for China, India, Japan, and the United States 
based on the new international survey on bequest plans.  We discuss our findings 
pertaining to the strength of bequest motives, stated bequest motives, and bequest 
division plans in subsections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, respectively.  
 
4.1. Evidence on the Strength of Bequest Motives 
 
In this subsection, we present evidence on the strength of bequest motives in China, 
India, Japan, and the United States from the new survey on bequest plans.  As 
explained in the next subsection, this survey asks respondents about how they feel 
about leaving an inheritance to their child(ren), and the responses can be grouped 
according to the strength of their bequest motives.  The response implying the 
strongest bequest motive is “I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) no matter 
what” (to be referred to as an “unconditional bequest motive”), the responses implying 
the second strongest bequest motive are the three responses “I plan to leave an 
inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide care (including nursing care) during old 
age,” “I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide financial 
assistance during old age” and “I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if 
they carry on the family business” (to be collectively referred to as a “conditional 
bequest motive”), and the response implying the third strongest bequest motive is “I 
want to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but I won't because I don't have the 
financial capacity to do so” (to be referred to as a “potential bequest motive”). 
 
By contrast, the responses implying the weakest bequest motive are “I do not plan to 
leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances because doing so may 
reduce their will to work” and “I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
under any circumstances because I want to use my wealth myself” (to be collectively 
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referred to as “no bequest motive”), and the response implying the second weakest 
bequest motive is “I do not plan to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to my 
child(ren) but will leave whatever is left over” (to be referred to as a “passive bequest 
motive”). 
 
The results are shown in Table 1, and as can be seen from this table, the proportion of 
respondents with an unconditional bequest motive is highest in India (68.98%), second 
highest in the United States (58.17%), third highest in China (34.24%), and lowest in 
Japan (26.67%).  Similarly, the proportion of respondents with an unconditional or 
conditional bequest motive is highest in India (87.05%), second highest in the United 
States (60.77%), third highest in China (56.35%), and lowest in Japan (31.44%), and  
the proportion of respondents with an unconditional, conditional, or potential bequest 
motive is highest in India (95.88%), second highest in the United States (73.18%), third 
highest in China (59.23%), and lowest in Japan (49.56%). 
 
By contrast, the proportion of respondents with no bequest motive at all is highest in 
China (4.81%), second highest in Japan (2.48%), third highest in the United States 
(1.82%), and lowest in India (0.62%), the proportion of respondents with only a passive 
bequest motive is highest in Japan (47.96), second highest in China (35.96%), third 
highest in the United States (25.00%), and lowest in India (3.50%), and the proportion of 
respondents with either no bequest motive at all or only a passive bequest motive is 
highest in Japan (50.44%), second highest in China (40.77%), third highest in the 
United States (26.82%), and lowest in India (4.12%). 
 
Thus, the strength of bequest motives varies considerably from country to country, and 
according to virtually all criteria, bequest motives are strongest in India, second 
strongest in the United States, third strongest in China, and weakest in Japan.  
Reassuringly, these findings are consistent with the findings of the studies surveyed in 
subsection 2.2.1, which find that actual bequests are quantitatively more important in 
the United States than they are in Japan. 
 
However, as explained in subsection 2.1, evidence on the strength of bequest motives 
does not necessarily shed light on which assumption concerning household preferences 
holds in the real world because positive bequests are consistent with all three 
assumptions concerning household preferences and one needs evidence on the motives 
for which households leave bequests in order to know which assumption concerning 
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household preferences holds in the real world.  It is to such evidence that we turn next. 
 
4.2.  Evidence on Stated Bequest Motives 
 
The new survey on bequest plans asks respondents how they feel about leaving an 
inheritance to their child(ren), with the responses (grouped by the assumption 
concerning household preferences with which they are consistent) being as follows: 
 
(Responses consistent with altruism) 
(1) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) no matter what.  
(2) I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances 
because doing so may reduce their will to work.  
 
 (Responses consistent with self-interest) 
(3) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide care (including 
nursing care) during old age.  
(4) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide financial 
assistance during old age.  
(5) I do not plan to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but will 
leave whatever is left over.  
(6) I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances 
because I want to use my wealth myself.  
 
(Responses consistent with dynasty building) 
(7) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they carry on the family 
business.  
 
(Response for which consistency with an assumption concerning household preferences 
is not clear) 
(8) I want to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but I won’t because I don’t have the 
financial capacity to do so.  
 
The results are shown in Table 2, with motives being grouped by the assumption 
concerning household preferences with which they are consistent and with response (8) 
being dropped. 
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As can be seen from this table, the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward 
bequests is consistent with altruism is highest in India (75.80%), second highest in the 
United States (66.97%), third highest in China (37.40%), and lowest in Japan (33.98%), 
while the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequests is consistent with  
self-interest is highest in Japan (64.96%), second highest in China (55.10%), third 
highest in the United States (32.76%), and lowest in India (21.82%). 
 
Finally, the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequests is consistent with 
dynasty building is low (no higher than 7.50%) in all four countries but is highest in 
China (7.50%), followed by India (2.38%), Japan (1.06%), and the United States (0.26%). 
 
Thus, it appears that there are considerable differences among the four countries in 
stated bequest motives, with stated bequest motives being primarily altruistic in India 
and the United States and primarily selfish in Japan and China and dynastic motives 
not being important in any of the four countries but more important in China than 
elsewhere. 
 
Moreover, a comparison of Tables 1 and 2 shows that there is a very high correlation 
between the strength of bequest motives and stated bequest motives, with the rank 
ordering of the four countries being exactly the same regardless of whether they are 
ranked according to the strength of bequest motives or according to the proportion of 
respondents whose attitude toward bequests is consistent with altruism, with India 
being first, the United States second, China third, and Japan last.  Conversely, the 
rank ordering of the four countries when they are ranked according to the strength of 
bequest motives is just the opposite of their rank ordering when they are ranked 
according to the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequests is consistent 
with self-interest.  It thus appears that altruistic individuals have strong bequest 
motives and that selfish individuals have weak bequest motives, as conventional 
wisdom would predict.  Moreover, our findings are broadly consistent with the findings 
of the studies surveyed in subsection 2.2.2, which find that bequest motives are more 
altruistic in the United States than they are in Japan. 
 
Looking in more detail at the importance of the individual responses, the dominant 
altruistic motive in all four countries is “I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) 
no matter what,” and the rank ordering of the four countries with respect to the 
proportion of respondents selecting this response is identical to the rank ordering of the 
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four countries with respect to the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward 
bequests is consistent with altruism. 
 
Similarly, the dominant selfish motive in all countries except India is “I do not plan to 
make special efforts to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but will leave whatever is 
left over,” and the rank ordering of the four countries with respect to the proportion of 
respondents selecting this response is identical to the rank ordering of the four 
countries with respect to the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequests 
is consistent with self-interest. 
 
By contrast, the proportion of respondents selecting the two exchange-related selfish 
motives (“I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide care 
(including nursing care) during old age” and “I plan to leave an inheritance to my 
child(ren) only if they provide financial assistance during old age”) is highest in India 
(and second highest in China) and lowest in Japan (and second lowest in the United 
States) even though the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequests is 
consistent with self-interest is lowest in India and highest in Japan. 
 
Finally, the proportion of respondents who do not plan to leave an inheritance for either 
altruistic or selfish reasons is small (less than 3%) in all four countries, and the 
proportion of respondents who plan to leave an inheritance to their child(ren) only if 
they carry on the family business (the only response that is consistent with the dynasty 
model) is also small (no higher than 7.50%) in all four countries.  
 
Thus, except for the results for exchange-related selfish motives, the detailed results 
are consistent with our earlier finding that bequest motives are primarily altruistic in 
India and the United States and primarily selfish in Japan and China and that dynastic 
motives are not important in any of the four countries but more important in China 
than elsewhere.  As for why exchange-related selfish motives are stronger in India and 
China than in Japan and the United States, it could be because mutual assistance and 
support and risk sharing within the family are necessarily stronger in countries where 
social safety nets are weaker, as suggested by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999).  
 
4.3.  Evidence on Bequest Division Plans 
 
Evidence on bequest division plans can shed further light on which assumption 
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concerning household preferences holds in the real world so, in this subsection, we 
present evidence on bequest division plans in China, India, Japan, and the United 
States from the new survey on bequest plans.  This survey asks respondents not only 
about how they feel about leaving inheritances to their child(ren) but also about how 
they plan to divide their inheritances among their children.  However, since bequest 
division among one’s children is a moot question in the case of respondents with no 
children or only one child, only respondents with two or more children are asked about 
bequest division plans.  They are first asked whether they plan to divide their 
inheritances equally or unequally among their children, and those who are planning to 
divide their inheritances unequally are then asked how they plan to divide their 
inheritances among their children, with the following responses (grouped by the 
assumption concerning household preferences with which they are consistent): 
 
(Responses consistent with altruism) 
(1) I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who has less earning capacity.  
(2) I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who has greater needs.  
(3) I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) whom I like more.  
 
(Responses consistent with self-interest) 
(4) I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who lives with me.  
(5) I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who lives near me.  
(6) I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who helps me with housework.  
(7) I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who provides nursing care.  
(8) I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who provides financial assistance.  
 
(Responses consistent with dynasty building) 
(9) I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who carries on the family business.  
(10) I plan to leave more or all to my eldest son or daughter even if he/she does not 
live with me, does not live near me, does not help me with housework, does not 
provide nursing care, does not provide financial assistance, and does not carry on 
the family business.  
 
As can be seen from Table 3, the proportion of respondents whose way of dividing their 
bequest among their children is consistent with altruism is high (in excess of 70%) in all 
four countries but highest in the United States (97.58%), second highest in India 
(84.35%), third highest in Japan (80.12%), and lowest in China (78.79%).  These 
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findings are broadly consistent with the findings of previous studies surveyed in 
subsection 2.2.3, which find that bequest division is much more altruistic in the United 
States than in Japan. 
 
By contrast, the proportion of respondents whose way of dividing their bequest among 
their children is consistent with self-interest is highest in Japan (20.46%), second 
highest in China (19.28%), third highest in India (15.63%), and lowest in the United 
States (2.52%).  Similarly, the proportion of respondents whose way of dividing their 
bequest among their children is consistent with dynasty building is highest in China 
(7.85%), second highest in Japan (7.51%), third highest in the United States (0.84%), 
and lowest in India (0.48%). 
 
Thus, the results pertaining to bequest division plans are broadly consistent with the 
results pertaining to stated bequest motives, with Americans and Indians being more 
altruistic than the Japanese and Chinese, the Japanese and Chinese being more selfish 
than Americans and Indians, and dynastic motives being unimportant in all countries 
but more important in China than in the other countries. 
 
Looking in more detail at the importance of the individual responses, equal division 
among one’s children is by far the most common response in all four countries, with the 
proportion of respondents who plan to divide their bequests equally exceeding 70% in all 
four countries.  This proportion was highest in the United States (92.55%), second 
highest in India (84.17%), third highest in Japan (72.67%), and lowest in China 
(70.28%), and hence the rank ordering of the four countries is exactly the same as in the 
case of the proportion of respondents whose planned way of dividing their bequest 
among their children is consistent with altruism.   
 
Turning to the importance of the responses for dividing bequests unequally, most of 
them are of only negligible importance, with the proportion of respondents choosing any 
given response exceeding 10% in only three cases, all of which occur in Japan and 
China: 14.38% of Japanese respondents selected the response “I plan to leave more or 
all to the child (children) who lives with me,” while 12.82% of Japanese respondents and 
11.60% of Chinese respondents selected the response “I plan to leave more or all to the 
child (children) who provides nursing care.”  Both of these responses are consistent 
with self-interest, and thus the fact that they were found to be the most prevalent in the 
two countries in which preferences are the most selfish is not at all surprising. 
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The three altruistic responses excluding equal division, the three selfish responses 
excluding the two aforementioned ones, and the two dynastic responses are not 
important in any country, with no more than 6.5% of responses selecting any of these 
responses in any of the four countries. 
 
Thus, the results concerning bequest division plans are somewhat divergent from our 
earlier results concerning stated bequest motives, with bequest division plans being 
much more altruistic than stated bequest motives in all countries and bequest division 
plans being more selfish in China than in Japan and more altruistic in the United 
States than in India, which is the opposite of the pattern observed for stated bequest 
motives.  However, the discrepancy regarding the prevalence of altruism can be 
reconciled if one bears in mind that equal division is not consistent with the simplest 
version of the altruism model and that it is consistent with the altruism model only if it 
is extended to include the presence of relative deprivation or some other additional 
assumption, as noted in subsection 2.1, meaning that regarding equal division as being 
consistent with altruism will lead to an overestimate of the proportion of households 
whose bequest division plans are consistent with altruism. 
 
Our findings pertaining to stated bequest motives and those pertaining to bequest 
division plans are mutually consistent in that they both indicate that the applicability 
of the various assumptions concerning household preferences vary greatly from country 
to country, with Americans and Indians being much more altruistic than the Japanese 
and Chinese and the Japanese and Chinese being much more selfish than Americans 
and Indians, and that dynastic preferences are not very prevalent in any of the four 
countries but are more prevalent in China than elsewhere.  Moreover, our findings are 
also broadly consistent with the findings of previous studies surveyed in subsection 2.2, 
which find that Americans are more altruistic than the Japanese. 
 
 
5. Possible Reasons for Inter-Country Differences in Bequest Plans 
 
Our results suggest that there are substantial inter-country differences in the 
prevalence of self-interest and altruism, with the bequest plans of Americans and 
Indians being much more consistent with altruism than those of the Japanese and 
Chinese and the bequest plans of the Japanese and Chinese being much more 
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consistent with self-interest than those of Americans and Indians.  In this section, we 
speculate about the reasons for these substantial inter-country differences in bequest 
plans.  One possibility is that inter-country differences in bequest plans reflect 
inter-country differences in household preferences.  Alternatively, these differences 
may reflect inter-country differences in outside influences on bequest plans such as 
income levels, income growth, inheritance laws, tax policies, social safety nets, social 
norms, and other institutions and government policies, as noted in subsection 2.1. 
 
Looking first at the impact of income levels, households living in countries with high 
income levels should have stronger bequest motives than households living in countries 
with low income levels if poor households cannot afford to leave bequests and bequests 
are a superior good those consumption increases with income.  Thus, the fact that 
bequest motives are strong in the United States where income levels are high and weak 
in China where income levels are low suggests that inter-country differences in income 
levels can partly explain inter-country differences in the strength of bequest motives.  
However, the fact that bequest motives are weak in Japan even though income levels 
are high and strong in India even though income levels are low and the fact that the 
proportion of respondents who don’t plan to leave a bequest because they don’t have the 
financial capacity to do so is much higher in Japan and the United States than in China 
and India even though income levels are much higher in these countries (see Table 1) 
point toward the opposite conclusion. 
 
Looking next at the impact of income growth, households living in countries with high 
rates of income growth should be less likely to leave bequests, ceteris paribus, than 
households living in countries with low rates of income growth because high rates of 
income growth imply that the lifetime incomes of children will be much higher than the 
lifetime incomes of parents.  Thus, the fact that bequest motives are strong in the 
United States where income growth has been low and weak in China where income 
growth has been high suggests that inter-country differences in income growth can 
partly explain inter-country differences in the strength of bequest motives. However, 
the fact that bequest motives are strong in India even though income growth has been 
high and weak in Japan even though income growth has been low points toward the 
opposite conclusion. 
 
Looking next at the impact of inheritance laws, the fact that the equal division of 
bequests among one’s children is less prevalent in Japan than elsewhere even though it 
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is not possible to disinherit any given child completely in Japan (one is legally required 
to leave at least one-half of an equal share to each child) suggests that inter-country 
differences in inheritance laws are not the explanation for inter-country differences in 
bequest division plans. 
 
Looking next at the impact of social safety nets for the elderly (public old-age pensions, 
long-term care insurance, health insurance, etc.), our finding that the use of bequests to 
induce one’s children to provide care and/or attention during old age is much more 
prevalent in China and India, where social safety nets for the elderly are less developed, 
and less prevalent in Japan and the United States, where social safety nets for the 
elderly are more developed, suggests that inter-country differences in social safety nets 
for the elderly are a partial explanation for inter-country differences in stated bequest 
motives. 
 
Looking finally at the impact of social norms, the social norm in Japan and China has 
traditionally been primogeniture, meaning that eldest sons inherit the entire estate of 
their parents but are expected, in exchange, to live with their parents and care for them 
during their old age.  The present Civil Codes of both Japan and China provide for 
equal division, but primogeniture is still surprisingly common and can be legally 
enforced if the decedent leaves a will and/or if all children other than the eldest son 
“voluntarily” renounce their inheritance rights (see Horioka (2002) for a more detailed 
discussion).  If social norms are an important influence on bequest plans, we would 
expect equal division to be less prevalent and dynastic bequest division to be more 
prevalent in Japan and China than in the United States and India, and this is, in fact, 
exactly what we find.   
 
It thus appears that many outside influences on household behavior (such as income 
levels, income growth, and inheritance laws) are not capable of explaining inter-country 
differences in bequest plans although some outside influences (such social safety nets 
for the elderly and social norms) are capable of partly explaining inter-country 
differences in bequest plans.  This implies that inter-country differences in bequest 
plans are at least partly due to inter-country differences in household preferences. 
 
Turning finally to the question of why household preferences vary from country to 
country, one possibility is that inter-country differences in household preferences reflect 
inter-country differences in culture.  The fact that bequest plans are similar in Japan 
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and China, which have very similar cultures, suggests that inter-country differences in 
culture are a partial explanation for inter-country differences in bequest plans, but the 
fact that bequest plans are similar in the United States and India even though they 
have very different cultures suggests that culture is not the main explanation for 
inter-country differences in bequest plans. 
 
Another possibility is that more deeply religious people have more altruistic preferences 
and that inter-country differences in the degree of religiosity (which is one component of 
culture) can explain inter-country differences in household preferences.  The survey we 
used asks respondents whether or not the statement “I am deeply religious” applies to 
him/her, with 1 indicating that it is particular true for him/her and 5 indicating that it 
does not hold true at all for him/her, and this question was asked in all countries except 
for China.  The results for this question, combined with supplementary data on all four 
countries from Zuckerman (2005), suggest that the degree of religiosity is highest in 
India, second highest in the United States, third highest in China, and by far the lowest 
in Japan (see Table 4).  This is exactly the same rank ordering as when the four 
countries are ranked with respect to the extent to which their stated bequest motives 
are altruistic, which suggests that inter-country differences in the degree of religiosity 
may explain inter-country differences in household preferences, which in turn may 
explain inter-country differences in bequest plans.  The importance of religiosity is 
confirmed by Gans, Silverstein, and Lowenstein (2009), who find that religious children 
are more likely to provide care to their aged parents.  In a different context, Lehrer 
(2004) and Mukhopadhyay (2011) analyze the impact of religiosity on educational 
attainment and find that religiosity has a significant impact on educational attainment, 
with Lehrer (2004) finding that it has a positive impact and Mukhopadhyay (2011) 
finding that it has a negative impact.  This provides further corroboration that one’s 
degree of religiosity may affect one’s preferences and behavior. 
 
It thus appears that inter-country differences in household bequest plans are not due to 
inter-country differences in income levels, income growth, or inheritance laws but that 
they partly reflect inter-country differences in social safety nets and social norms and 
partly reflect inter-country differences in household preferences, which in turn may 
reflect inter-country differences in the degree of religiosity.  There are other possible 
reasons for inter-country differences in household preferences such as inter-country 
differences in genes, the degree of financial development, and tax systems (for example, 
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the level and structure of income taxes, property taxes, and estate taxes and the 
availability of tax breaks for charitable contributions).  A causal analysis on the 
importance of these factors is left as a topic for future research. 
 
 
6. Summary, Conclusions, and Policy Implications 
 
In this paper, we discussed three alternative assumptions concerning household 
preferences (altruism, self-interest, and a desire for dynasty-building) and showed that 
these assumptions have very different implications for bequest motives and bequest 
division.  After reviewing some of the literature on actual bequests, bequest motives, 
and bequest division, the paper presented data on the strength of bequest motives, 
stated bequest motives, and bequest division plans from a new international survey 
conducted in China, India, Japan, and the United States.  It found striking 
inter-country differences in bequest plans, with the bequest plans of the Japanese and 
Chinese appearing to be much more consistent with selfish preferences than those of 
Americans and Indians and the bequest plans of Americans and Indians appearing to be 
much more consistent with altruistic preferences than those of the Japanese and 
Chinese.  Finally, we found that inter-country differences in bequest plans are 
apparently not due to inter-country differences in income levels, income growth, or 
inheritance laws but could partly reflect inter-country differences in social safety nets 
for the elderly and social norms and partly reflect inter-country differences in household 
preferences, which in turn may reflect inter-country differences in the degree of 
religiosity. 
 
It thus appears that when economists model household behavior, it is important to use a 
model that nests selfish as well as altruistic preferences or to use a model that assumes 
selfish preferences in countries where self-interest dominates and a model that assumes 
altruistic preferences in countries where altruism dominates. 
 
Turning finally to the policy implications of our findings, it is well-known that the 
impact of government policies are dramatically different depending on whether 
households are selfish, altruistic, or dynastic (see Barro (1974), Masson and Pestieau  
(1996), and Arrondel and Masson (2006)).  
 
For example, our finding that the Japanese and Chinese are predominantly selfish 
26 
 
implies that Ricardian equivalence will not hold in Japan and China and that tax cuts 
financed by the issuance of government bonds will be effective as an economic stimulus 
in these countries because households in these countries will not care about the higher 
taxes that future generations will have to pay in order to redeem the government bonds 
and will therefore increase their consumption spending in response to the tax cuts.  By 
contrast, our finding that Americans and Indians are predominantly altruistic implies 
that Ricardian equivalence will hold in the United States and India and that tax cuts 
financed by the issuance of government bonds will not be effective as an economic 
stimulus in these countries because households will save the entire tax cut in order to 
increase their bequests and compensate future generations for the higher taxes they 
will have to pay when it comes time for the government to redeem its bonds (see Barro 
(1974)). 
  
Similarly, our finding that the Japanese and Chinese are predominantly selfish implies 
that the introduction of a pay-as-you-go public old-age pension system will reduce 
household saving in Japan and China because the introduction of such a system will 
alleviate the need for them to save on their own in preparation for retirement.  
Moreover, the introduction of such a system will also enable them to enjoy a higher 
standard of living during retirement, which is presumably the aim of such a system, 
because the introduction of such a system will force them to postpone consumption until 
after retirement.  By contrast, our finding that Americans and Indians are 
predominantly altruistic implies that the introduction of a pay-as-you-go public old-age 
pension system will not have any impact on household saving in the United States and 
India because households will bequeath all of their pension benefits to their children to 
compensate them for the payroll taxes they will have to pay to finance these benefits, 
meaning that they will have to save just as much as before to finance their living 
expenses during retirement.  Moreover, the living standards of Americans and Indians 
during retirement will not be raised at all by the introduction of such a system because 
they will bequeath all of their pension benefits to their children. 
 
We turn finally to the implications of our findings for inheritance taxes and other 
mechanisms for alleviating the intergenerational transmission of wealth inequalities.  
Our finding that the Japanese and Chinese are predominantly selfish implies that 
wealth inequalities are less likely to be passed on from generation to generation in 
Japan and China because selfish households will leave less bequests and because they 
will leave a bequest to their children only if there is a quid pro quo from their children 
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such as care, attention and/or financial support during old age, meaning that bequests 
from parents to children will be at least partly offset by intergenerational transfers in 
the other direction (namely, the monetary value of care, attention, and/or financial 
support from children to parents).  By contrast, our finding that Americans and 
Indians are predominantly altruistic implies that wealth inequalities are more likely to 
be passed on from generation to generation in the United States and India because 
Americans and Indians will leave more bequests and because they will leave a bequest 
to their children even if there is no quid pro quo from their children, meaning that their 
bequests will be less likely to be offset by intergenerational transfers in the opposite 
direction.４  Furthermore, Horioka (2009) finds that, in Japan, the correlation between 
bequests received and life cycle wealth is negative, meaning that individuals who 
receive fewer bequests accumulate more life cycle wealth, which will alleviate the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth inequalities.  Thus, our findings imply that 
there may be a greater need for estate taxes and other mechanisms for alleviating the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth inequalities in the United States and India 
than in Japan and China. 
 
It follows that activist government policies will be successful in achieving their 
objectives (for example, tax cuts financed by the issuance of government bonds will be 
effective in stimulating consumption and the economy as a whole and the introduction 
of a pay-as-you-go public old-age pension system will be effective in raising living 
standards during retirement) in Japan, China, and other countries with selfish 
denizens but not in India, the United States, and other countries with more altruistic 
denizens.  By contrast, estate taxes and other policies that alleviate the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth inequalities will be more necessary and 
desirable in India, the United States, and other countries with altruistic denizens than 
in Japan, China, and other countries with more selfish denizens. 
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The proportion of respondents holding each view (%) China India Japan U.S.
I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) no matter what 34.24 68.98 26.67 58.17
I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under certain conditions 22.11 18.07 4.76 2.60
Those with an actual bequest motive 56.35 87.05 31.44 60.77
I want to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but I won't because I don't have
the financial capacity to do so 2.88 8.83 18.12 12.41
Those with an actual or potential bequest motive 59.23 95.88 49.56 73.18
I do not plan to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to my child(ren)
but will leave whatever is left over 35.96 3.50 47.96 25.00
I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances 4.81 0.62 2.48 1.82
Those with only a passive bequest motive or no bequest motive at all 40.77 4.12 50.44 26.82
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number of observations 2264 1928 4514 3464
Table 1: An International Comparison of the Strength of Bequest Motives
Data Source: 2012 Preference Parameter Survey of Osaka University (Kurashi to Konomi to Manzokudo ni tsuite no Anke-to
Chousa) except for rural China, for which the 2010 survey was used.  The results for the urban and rural surveys for China and
India were weighted by the proportions of the urban and rural populations in each country (52/48% in China and 32/68% in
India).
Notes: The figures show the proportion of respondents excluding those who did not respond to this question.
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The proportion of respondents holding each view (%) China India Japan U.S.
I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) no matter what 35.25 75.66 32.58 66.41
I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances
because doing so may reduce their will to work 2.15 0.14 1.41 0.56
Responses consistent with altruism 37.40 75.80 33.98 66.97
I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide care
(including nursing care) during old age 10.10 11.49 4.06 2.08
I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide financial
assistance during old age 5.17 5.95 0.70 0.63
I do not plan to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to my child(ren)
but will leave whatever is left over 37.03 3.84 58.58 28.54
I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances
because I want to use my wealth myself 2.80 0.54 1.62 1.52
Responses consistent with self-interest 55.10 21.82 64.96 32.76
I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they carry on the family
business 7.50 2.38 1.06 0.26
Responses consistent with dynasty building 7.50 2.38 1.06 0.26
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Number of observations 2071 1866 3696 3034
Data Source: 2012 Preference Parameter Survey of Osaka University  (Kurashi to Konomi to Manzokudo ni tsuite no
Anke-to Chousa) except for rural China, for which the 2010 survey was used.  The results for the urban and rural surveys
for China and India were weighted by the proportions of the urban and rural populations in each country (52/48% in
China and 32/68% in India).
Table 2: An International Comparison of Stated Bequest Motives
Altruism
Self-Interest
Dynasty Building
Notes: The figures show the proportion of respondents excluding those who did not respond to this question and those
who replied that they want to leave a bequest to their child(ren) but won't because they don't have the financial capacity
to do so.
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The proportion of respondents holding each view (%) China  India Japan U.S.
I plan to divide my inheritance equally among my children 70.28 84.17 72.67 92.55
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who has less earning
capacity 6.42 0.04 4.39 1.38
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who has greater needs 1.95 0.13 3.90 3.06
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) whom I like more 0.90 0.00 0.75 1.43
Responses consistent with altruism 78.79 84.35 80.12 97.58
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who lives with me 4.11 6.99 14.38 0.94
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who lives near me 1.84 4.63 4.07 0.74
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who helps me with
housework 2.09 1.96 4.49 0.69
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who provides nursing care 11.60 5.63 12.82 0.54
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who provides financial
assistance 2.56 1.25 4.85 0.59
Responses consistent with self-interest 19.28 15.63 20.46 2.52
I plan to leave more or all to the child (children) who carries on the family
business 4.25 0.41 5.04 0.10
I plan to leave more or all to my eldest son or daughter even if he/she does
not live with me, does not live near me, does not help me with housework,
does not provide nursing care, does not provide financial assistance, and
does not carry on the family business
3.82 0.07 2.83 0.74
Responses consistent with dynasty building 7.85 0.48 7.51 0.84
Total 105.92 100.46 108.08 100.94
Number of observations 733 1780 3118 2457
Data Source: 2012 Preference Parameter Survey of Osaka University (Kurashi to Konomi to Manzokudo ni tsuite no
Anke-to Chousa) except for rural China, for which the 2010 survey was used.  The results for the urban and rural
surveys for China and India were weighted by the proportions of the urban and rural populations in each country
(52/48% in China and 32/68% in India).
Table 3: An International Comparison of Bequest Division Plans
Altruism
Self-Interest
Dynasty Building
Notes: The figures show the proportion of respondents excluding those who did not answer the question about stated
bequest motives, those who replied that they would not leave a bequest, and those who have zero or one child.  Those
who responded that they would divide their bequest unequally but did not answer the follow-up question about bequest
division were assumed to have the same distribution of answers for the follow-up question as those who answered the
follow-up question.   The totals do not necessarily add up because mutliple responses are allowed.
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China  India Japan U.S.
The degree of religiosity (on a scale of 1 to 5) na 3.66 1.66 2.99
The number of observations 1928 4556 3559
The proportion of believers in God 86-94 94-98 35-36 91-97
Table 4: An International Comparison of Religiosity
Note: "na" denotes "not available."
Data Source: First 2 rows: 2012 Preference Parameter Survey of Osaka University (Kurashi to
Konomi to Manzokudo ni tsuite no Anke-to Chousa).  The results for the urban and rural surveys
for India were weighted by the proportions of the urban and rural populations (32/68%).  The order
of the responses was reversed so that 5 indicates that it is particularly true for him/her and 1
indicates that it does not hold true at all for him/her.  Last row: Zuckerman (2005).
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Endnotes 
 
                                                  
１Two additional assumptions concerning household preferences are (1) that the 
household derives utility not only from its own consumption but also from its wealth (as 
assumed in the “capitalist spirit” or “wealth-in-the-utility function” model of Carroll 
(2000)), and (2) that the household derives utility not only from its own consumption but 
also from the size of its bequest (as assumed in the “joy of giving,” “warm glow,” or 
“bequest-as-consumption” model of Abel and Warshawsky (1988)).  These assumptions 
are not discussed in detail here because they do not have clear implications for bequest 
motives and bequest division (except that assumption (2) implies that households will 
leave bequests to their children even without any quid pro quo, as in the case of 
altruistic preferences). 
 
２ The term “dynasty model” is often used to refer to what we call the “altruism model” 
but we use the term in a different sense.  What we call the dynasty model is also called 
the “primogeniture model” if it is the eldest son who carries on the family line and/or the 
family business (Chu (1991)).   
 
３ Another possibility is that selfish parents who want their children to take care of 
them in old age will set an example by taking care of their own elderly parents in front 
of their children (the so-called “demonstration effect” of Stark (1995) and Cox and Stark 
(1996)).  In this case, the quid pro quo for care given to one’s elderly parents will not be 
bequests received from one’s elderly parents but rather care received from one’s 
children. 
 
４ Note, however, that altruistic parents will leave more bequests to less affluent 
children, meaning that inter-sibling inequalities will be alleviated to a greater extent in 
the case of altruistic parents.  I am indebted to an anonymous referee for this point. 
